(Quote)

of like a more efficient and polished version of SGX, but for virtualization.

(Quote)

(Quote)

bmail eliminates that window entirely. Incoming mail never touches a normal server process. It enters an SGX secure enclave directly, where the TLS connection terminates inside hardware-isolated memor

Another big issue with SGX is that it does not protect the host from a malicious enclave. The EEXIT instruction restores the host process' execution context (including RIP and RSP) from registers mana

But yeah, that's definitely true. It's also the approach Intel went after Deprecating SGX on newer chips.

(Quote)

A bit later, there was also TresorSGX - someone's master thesis which instead of "hiding" keys in debug registers, used SGX enclaves to perform drive encryption operations. However t

(1) AMD can disable the SNP memory caching control and not allow breakpoints on SNP memory. This should be possible because SGX already does this according to the paper. That would make a memory profi

(Quote)

(Quote)

As far as I understand yes, Intel’s previous confidential computing offer was/is SGX. But this has several constraints on the system calls you can make. TDX allows more flexibility in that regard, sim

(Quote)

(Quote)

Plus, you know, most people don't even know SEV and SGX are a thing.

(Quote)

(Quote)

I would love to be wrong. If someone here actually runs SEV on their VMs (even SGX support would be something). For reasonable price I would buy it immediately.

(Quote)